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STATE OF UTAH 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE 
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R. 
FARRAR, his wife, and 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE 
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 9945 
No. 9946 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, SEAGULL INVESTMENT 
COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Van Zyverdens as buyers of a farm, on a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, commenced an action (No. 9945) against 
Farrars as sellers and Seagull as assignees of Farrars' 
interest thereunder, alleging breach of contract by both 
Farrars and Seagull and thereby attempting to excuse 
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their non-performance of the contract and seeking to 
recover damages. 
Seagull, as assignee of the sellers' interest in said con-
tract, commenced an action (Case No. 9946) against Van 
Zyverdens and filed a counterclaim (Case No. 9945) for 
damages for breach of contract, attorney fees, restitution 
of the farm and for unlawful detainer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The two cases (Nos. 9945 and 9946) were joined for 
trial in the District Court pursuant to stipulation of 
counsel. The cases were tried before the Court, setting 
without a jury, and judgment of no cause of action was 
entered against all parties on all claims for relief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Seagull Investment Company, seeks an 
order vacating the judgment of no cause of action against 
it on the claims for relief contained in its complaint and 
counterclaim and judgment against Van Zyverdens for 
restitution of possession of the farm, damages for breach 
of contract, attorney fees, interest, triple damages for 
unlawful detainer and costs, or, in the alternative, for an 
order remanding the case to the District Court for a new 
trial on the issues contained in its complaint and counter-
claim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These lawsuits are concerned with a dairy farm near 
Heber City, Utah, which was purchased in September, 
1960, by Van Zyverdens from Farrars (R. 226) for 
$60,000.00, with a down payment of $5,00Q.OO recited in 
the contract (R. 226) but which was not paid (R. 20). 
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Farrar~ assigned their interest as sellers under the uni-
form real estate contract (R. 226) to Seagull Investment 
Company (R. 242). Van Zyverdens defaulted in the per-
formance of their obligations under said contract (R. 226) 
in many particulars, including, but not limited to, their 
failure to pay the property taxes assessed against the 
farm (R. 543, L. 30, R. 544, L. 1-11), failure to pay the 
water assessments for irrigation water for the farm (R. 
544, L. 7-21), failure to keep the premises insured (R. 544, 
L. 5-9) and failure to pay the annual payments due on the 
purchase price on or before the 1st day of November, 
1961, and 1962 (R. 544, L. 19-24). Van Zyverdens have 
paid nothing toward the purchase price of the farm (R. 
543, L. 20-30, R. 544, L. 1-24) although they have had 
possession of the farm since September, 1960 (R. 226). 
The grace period for the payment by Van Zyverdens of 
the first annual payment on the purchase price of the 
farm expired November 30, 1961 (R. 226), and on Decem-
ber 1, 1961, Van Zyverdens commenced legal action (Case 
No. 9945) , claiming damages for alleged breach of con-
tract by Farrars and Seagull and asked for $18,000.00 
credit against the purchase price for the alleged damages 
or in the alternative for judgment for that amount. 
Seagull made written demand upon Van Zyverdens on 
November 15, 1961, for payment of the 1961 property 
taxes and the installment of $6,334.17 due on the purchase 
price on November 1, 1961 (R. 33, 288), and on December 
1, 1961 sent them (mailed them) a notice to remedy their 
default or to quit (R. 32, 287) which was refused by Van 
Zyverdens (see discussion under point I). 
Seagull caused a notice of default (R. 266-272) to be 
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served upon Van Zyverdens about January 3, 1963, 
wherein Seagull elected, under paragraph 16A of the real 
estate contract (R. 226), to terminate the interest of Van 
Zyverdens in and to said farm and the real estate conract 
at the end of 5 days, in the event that they failed to 
remedy their defaults within that time, and notified Van 
Zyverdens that they would thereafter be guilty of unlaw-
ful detainer if they failed to vacate and surrender said 
premises. Van Zyverdens failed to remedy their default 
or to surrender the farm and Seagull commenced an 
action (Case No. 9946) against Van Zyverdens, seeking 
restitution of the premises, damages for breach of con-
tract, attorney fees and triple damages for unlawful 
detainer. 
Seagull caused another notice (R. 233-240) to be served 
upon Van Zyverdens (R. 60-61, Ex. 5) on or about the 
lOth day of February, 1962, wherein Van Zyverdens were 
informed that if for any reason the previous notices 
served were insufficient, that they would be guilty of 
unlawful detainer if they failed to vacate said premises 
within 5 days after service of that notice. Van Zyverdens 
still failed to remedy their default or to quit, and on or 
about the 13th day of February, 1962, Seagull filed a 
counterclaim (R. 40-43) against Van Zyverdens in the 
action already commenced by Van Zyverdens (No. 9945), 
wherein Seagull asked for damages for breach of contract, 
attorney fees and triple damages for unlawful detainer. 
At the trial Seagull offered the February 10, 1963 notice 
(R. 233-240) in evidence (R. 546) and, upon objection by 
Van Zyverdens as to its admissability on the alleged 
grounds that it was served after these actions were com-
menced (which is untrue as to No. 9945), the Court took 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
the question of its admissability under advisement (R. 
546, L. 9-12) but never ruled on this matter. Seagull 
moved for permission to amend its pleadings to refer to 
the notice of February 10, 1963, when Van Zyverdens 
objected to its admissability, but this motion was not 
granted (R. 61). 
Seagull served certain requests for admissions upon 
Van Zyverdens on the 27th day of January, 1962 (R. 26-
38, 281-293). The default of Van Zyverdens for failure to 
admit or deny said requests for admissions as required by 
law was entered on February 7, 1962 (R. 39, 294). These 
default certificates have never been stricken or set aside. 
No answers have ever been filed to the requests for 
admissions in Case No. 9946, and accordingly the state-
ments contained therein are deemed to be admitted. A 
partial answer to the requests for admissions served in 
Case No. 9945 was filed by Van Zyverdens after the time 
for answer thereof had expired and accordingly the state-
ments contained in those requests for admission are also 
deemed admitted (see discussion under point I). 
The cases were tried on December 4, 1962, before the 
Court, anct a decision was signed by the Honorable R. L. 
Tuckett, District Judge, on the 28th day of March, 1963 
(R. 189-190), wherein the Court awarded judgment of no 
cause of action against Van Zyverdens and Farrars and 
also against Seagull on the grounds that the notice of 
January 3, 1963 (R. 266-273) was insufficient in that said 
notice allegedly failed to give Van Zyverdens an option 
to perform the conditions or to surrender or quit the 
premises (R. 190). No mention was made in that decision 
of the notice of February 10, 1962 (R. 233-240), or con-
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cerning the other claims for relief asserted by Seagull 
(R. 40-43). Seagull moved the Court to amend its deci-
sion (R. 191-195) and pointed out to the Court that the 
notice expressly gave Van Zyverdens the option to rem-
edy their default or to quit (R. 191-192), however, the 
Court denied Seagull's motion (R. 215). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSION ARE DEEMED ADMITTED BY VAN 
ZYVERDENS AND ACCORDINGLY SEAGULL IS 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Requests for admission were served upon Van Zyver-
dens by Seagull on January 27, 1962, in both cases (R. 26-
29, 281-285), and on February 7, 1962, the default of Van 
Zyverdens was entered in both cases (R. 39, 294) in ac-
cordance with Rule 55 (a) (1), URCP, by reason of their 
failure to respond thereto. The requests for admission 
were not denied within the time allowed by law, the 
default certificates have never been set aside and the 
statements contained therein are deemed admitted in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 36 (a), URCP. 
Motions to strike the requests for admission which were 
filed by Van Zyverdens on January 31, 1962 (R. 25, 280), 
do not comply with the express requirements of Rule 
36 (a) in several particulars including the requirement 
that objections be served with a notice of hearing at the 
earliest practicable time and accordingly the motions to 
strike are insufficient to prevent the admissions from 
being deemed to be admitted. 
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The proported answers to a part of the requests for 
admissions, in Case No. 9945, were untimely and accord-
ingly were without legal force or effect to avoid the 
admission of the statements contained therein. 
The objections to the requests for admissions which 
were raised by Van Zyverdens in their motions to strike 
the requests for admissions were disposed of on February 
5, 1962, by the Court striking the default certificate which 
had been entered against Seagull in Case No. 9945. Even 
if the motions to strike had been well taken and properly 
served (which we deny), their objections were disposed 
of by the striking of said default on February 5, 1962, and 
accordingly the requests for admission were deemed ad-
mitted 10 days after that date since no answer or 
objections were filed within that time. 
The requests for admissions served in Case No. 9946 
have never been answered by either Van Zyverden, and 
the requests for admission served in Case No. 9945 have 
never been answered by Sytske Van Zyverden (R. 48-50), 
although a separate answer was required from both Leo 
and Sytske Van Zyverden (R. 26), and accordingly the 
statements contained therein are deemed to be admitted 
as to Sytske Van Zyverden in both cases and as to both 
Van Zyverdens in Case No. 9946. 
In both cases Seagull asks for restitution of the prem-
ises, damages for breach of contract, attorney fees and for 
triple damages under the unlawful detainer statute. The 
relief sought by Seagull and to which Seagull is entitled 
is more fully discussed under other points in this brief 
and will not be reviewed here, however, the admission of 
the facts stated in the requests for admissions entitled 
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Seagull to relief under all of its claims for relief, including 
but not limited to relief under the unlawful detainer 
statute, since the admission of the statement contained in 
request for admission No. 20 (R. 27, 283) is an admission 
that Van Zyverdens are guilty of unlawful detainer. 
POINT II 
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION OF THE 
FARM AND TO DAMAGES UNDER THE TERMS OF 
EXHIBIT 1 AND ALSO TO RESTITUTION AND DAM-
AGES UNDER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER ST ... t\T-
UTES. 
Seagull elected to exercise its rights under paragraph 
16A of Exhibit 1 (R. 226) on December 1, 1961, when 
Van Zyverdens defaulted in making their first annual 
payment of $6,334.17, due on the purchase price of the 
farm, and the payment of irrigation water assess1nents 
due on the farm of $333.98, by mailing a notice of default 
to Van Zyverdens wherein Van Zyverdens were given an 
option to remedy their default or to quit (R. 32, 287). 
Van Zyverdens admitted the mailing of that letter by 
Seagull and their refusal of delivery thereof by reason of 
their failure to respond to requests for admissions No. 3, 
4 and 5 (R. 26, 281) (see also discussion under point I 
above). Under the terms of paragraph 16A of exhibit 1 
(R. 226), and the election contained in that notice, Van 
Zyverdens became tenants at will of the farm on Decem-
ber 7, 1961, and accordingly were tenants at will when 
the January 3, 1962 notice (R. 266-273) was served, and 
Van Zyverdens became guilty of unlawful detainer 5 days 
thereafter when they failed to remedy their default. 
On January 3, 1962, Seagull served upon Van Zyver-
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dens an instrument entitled "NOTICE OF TERMINA-
TION OF CONTRACT and FIVE DAY NOTICE TO 
VACATE PREMISES" (R. 266-273). A copy of the con-
tract (R. 266, Ex. 1) and the assignment of the sellers' 
interest in that contract (R. 247, Ex. 10) were annexed to 
that notice and incorporated therein by reference. The 
Court based its decision of no cause of action against 
Seagull upon the grounds that said notice (R. 266-273) 
allegedly did not require the performance of the condi-
tions or the surrender of the premises and accordingly 
was insufficient in the view of the Court to sustain 
Seagull's claims for relief. In its decision the Court 
recited the alleged deficiency in said notice as follows: 
" ... The notice recited the defaults under the con-
tract, but nowhere were the Van Zyverdens required 
to perform the conditions or to surrender or quit the 
premises. Under the statute and the cases construing 
the same, it appears to the Court that service of a 
proper notice is an essential part of the plaintiff's and 
counterclaimant's cause of action .... " (R. 190) (em-
phasis added) . 
It is difficult to understand how the Court could fail to 
observe the options given Van Zyverdens in that notice, 
to remedy their default, unless only the heading of that 
notice were read. Seagull fully complied with the pro-
visions of paragraph 16A of the contract (R. 226), con-
cerning termination of Van Zyverdens' rights under the 
terms of the contract, and, with the requirements of the 
Unlawful Detainer Statute, and Seagull is entitled to 
restitution of the premises and to the other relief re-
quested, under the terms of the contract (R. 226) and/or 
under the provisions of the Unlawful Detainer Statutes, 
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78-36-3 (5), 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, and related statutes. 
Van Zyverdens were fully advised in said notice (R. 226) 
that they could, within 5 days after service of that notice, 
remedy their defaults under the contract and thereby 
avoid forfeiture of their interest under the contract. Van 
Zyverdens failed to do so and 5 days thereafter, if they 
were not already tenants at will because of the December 
1, 1961 notice, became tenants at will of the farm, and 
thereupon Seagull became entitled to possession of the 
farm as provided in said paragraph 16A (R. 226). The 
following is a summary of some of the various ways which 
Seagull informed Van Zyverdens in that notice of their 
option to remedy their default or to quit: 
1. The notice (R. 268) informed Van Zyverdens that 
Seagull had elected the remedy mentioned in paragraph 
16A of the contract (R. 226), and a copy of that contract 
was attached to the notice. Said paragraph 16A reads in 
part as follows: 
" ... upon failure of the buyer to remedy the default 
within five (5) days after written notice ... the buyer 
agrees that the seller may, at his option, re-enter and 
take possession of said premises without legal process 
as in its first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by the buyer 
thereon, and the said additions and improvements 
shall remain with the land and become the property 
of the seller, the buyer becoming at once a tenant at 
will of the seller . ... " (R. 226) (emphasis added) 
That paragraph of Exhibit 1 (R. 226) clearly specifies 
that Van Zyverdens could remedy their default within 5 
days after written notice, and accordingly said notice was 
sufficient to comply yvith both the forfeiture requirements 
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of that paragraph of the contract, since all of the terms 
thereof were recited by reference, and to constitute Van 
Zyverdens tenants at will. Reference to that paragraph in 
the notice was also sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of the statute which specifies when persons who hold 
property under the terms of an agreement are guilty of 
unlawful detainer, which statute reads in part as follows: 
78-36-3 ( 5). " ... when he continues in possession, in 
person or by sub-tenant, after a neglect or failure to 
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other 
than those hereinbefore mentioned, and after notice 
in writing requiring in the alternative the perform-
ance of such conditions or the surrender of the prem-
ises, served upon him, ... " (Emphasis added) 
Van Zyverdens were in default under the terms of the 
agreement under which they held the property, they 
failed to vacate the premises or to perform the conditions 
within 5 days after service of the notice (R. 266-273) and 
accordingly thereupon became guilty of unlawful de-
tainer under the provisions of the above mentioned stat-
ute. 
2. The notice (R. 268-269) refers to the specific un-
lawful detainer statute quoted in paragraph 1 above. That 
statute expressly gives Van Zyverdens an option to rem-
edy their default within 5 days after service of the notice, 
and accordingly reference to that statute, without more, is 
sufficient to appraise Van Zyverdens of their rights to 
reinstate and is sufficient to comply with the require-
ments of that statute concerning notice. 
3. The notice (R. 268) informed Van Zyverdens of the 
election of Seagull, under paragraph 16A (R. 226), to 
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terminate Van Zyverdens' interest in and to the contract 
and farm, in the event that they failed to remedy their 
default within 5 days, which notice was clearly sufficient 
under the terms of exhibit 1 (R. 226) to entitle Seagull to 
restitution of the premises by reason of breach of contract 
by Van Zyverdens, and/or also under the unlawful de-
tainer statutes. The . portion of the notice pertaining 
thereto reads in part as follows: 
"NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby notified that 
Seagull Investment Company does elect to exercise 
its rights as provided by sub-paragraph 'A' of para-
graph 16 of the contract annexed hereto as exhibit 
'A' to be released from all obligation in law and 
equity to convey said property and to terminate your 
interest in and to said premises at the end of five 
days after service of this notice upon you in the event 
that you fail to remedy the aforesaid defaults and to 
fully perform all of your obligations under said con-
tract within said time; that in the event that you 
fully perform all of your obligations under said con-
tract within that time you may reinstate said con-
tract." (R. 268) (Emphasis added) 
4. The notice (R. 268-269) again informed Van Zyver-
dens of their option to remedy their default within the 
5-day period mentioned in the notice and that, if they 
failed to do so, legal action would be commenced against 
them for restitution of the premises, triple damages for 
unlawful detainer, etc., which by itself is sufficient to 
entitle Seagull to restitution of the premises and the 
other relief sought by Seagull under the provisions of 
paragraph 16A of the contract (R. 226) andjor the un-
lawful detainer statute. The portion of the notice per-
taining thereto reads in part as follows: 
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~'You are further notified that in the event that you 
fail to remedy your defaults in performance of the 
covenants and conditions which you are obligation 
(sic) to perform under the terms of said contract, 
within five days after service of this notice upon you, 
that you will be guilty of Unlawful Detainer of said 
premises in accordance with the provisions of 78-36-
3 ( 5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that thereafter 
you will be liable for three times the amount of 
damages assessed for said unlawful detainer as pro-
vided by 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and 
related statutes, and that legal action will be com-
menced against you for restitution of said premises, 
treble damages, attorney fees, court costs, etc .... " 
(R. 268-269) (Emphasis added) 
Clearly Seagull complied with the requirements of 
paragraph 16A of Exhibit 1 (R. 226) and, in accordance 
with the provisions of that paragraph, Van Zyverdens 
became tenants at will of said premises at the end of 5 
days after written notice and their failure to remedy their 
default, if for any reason they were not tenants at will on 
December 7, 1961 as indicated above. The first written 
notice was mailed on December 1, 1961, and delivery 
thereof was refused by Van Zyverdens (and as demon-
strated above, said facts were established, as a result of 
failure to answer requests for admissions). Clearly notice 
cannot be defeated by the mere refusal to accept delivery 
of the notice, particularly where the parties had been 
corresponding about this matter through the mails (R. 33, 
288). The notice served on January 3, 1962, complied with 
the requir·ements of paragraph 16A of Exhibit 1 and in 
any event, Van Zyverdens became tenants at will of said 
premises five days after service of that notice by reason 
of their failure to remedy their default as provided 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
therein as indicated in paragraph 16A of Exhibit 1 (R. 
226) quoted above. 
Seagull is clearly entitled to restitution of the premises, 
damages, attorney fees and other relief requested in ac-
cordance with the provisions of paragraph 16A of exhibit 
1, independent of the unlawful detainer statute, and as 
requested in its complaint (R. 261, Par. 1) and its counter-
claim (R. 42) . The Court failed to rule upon this relief 
requested by Seagull and limited its decision to the ques-
tion of Seagull's right to recover under the unlawful 
detainer statute. It has been demonstrated above that the 
ruling of the Court, to the effect that Seagull failed to 
give Van Zyverdens an option to remedy their default or 
to quit in the notice, was in error, and accordingly Seagull 
is also entitled to restitution of the premises and to triple 
damages under the unlawful detainer statute as also in-
dependently requested by Seagull in the complaint (R. 
262, Par. 4) and the counterclaim (R. 42-43, Par. 5). It is 
common practice, under a contract for the sale of realty 
containing the usual forfeiture clause, to brjng an unlaw-
ful detainer against a defaulting vendee. Christy v. Guild, 
101 U. 313, 121 P.2d 401; Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 153, 
292 P. 206; Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 U. 
403, 195 p .2d 7 48. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING EX-
HIBIT 5, A SUBSEQUENT NOTICE TO QUIT, INTO 
EVIDENCE, AND IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE 
ULTIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING 
THE FARM. 
After Seagull's complaint had been filed in Case No. 
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9946 (Jan. 16, 1962- back of R. 273) and before the 
counterclaim was filed by Seagull in Case No. 9945 (Feb. 
13, 1962- back of R. 44) Seagull caused Exhibit 5 (R. 
233-240) to be served on Van Zyverdens on the lOth day 
of February, 1962 (R. 240). A copy of the notice to 
remedy default or to quit, served upon Van Zyverdens on 
January 3, 1962 (R. 266-273), was attached to Exhibit 5 
and incorporated therein by reference (R. 234-239). 
Exhibit 5 informed Van Zyverdens that, if for any 
reason, the demand to terminate their occupancy of the 
premises, mentioned in the earlier notice, was ineffect-
ive, that they would be guilty of unlawful detainer if they 
failed to vacate said premises within 5 days after service 
of that notice upon them (R. 233). Said notice further 
informed Van Zyverdens that the triple damages claimed 
in the pending legal proceedings were the same damages 
as those mentioned in Exhibit 5, and that the service of 
Ex:hibit 5 would not constitute a waiver of or affect the 
pending actions. 
Van Zyverdens failed to comply with the demands con-
tained in Exhibit 5 and continued to occupy the farm. 
Van Zyverdens objected to the introduction of Exhibit 5 
into evidence (R. 545-546), apparently on the alleged 
ground that it was served after these actions were com-
menced, however, as indicated above, Exhibit 5 was 
served three days before the counterclaim was filed in 
Case No. 9946, and the Court reserved ruling thereon 
(R. 546, L. 9-12). The Court made no mention of Exhibit 5 
in its decision (R. 189-190). Seagull moved the Court to 
amend its pleadings to refer to Exhibit 5 (R. 545) when 
Van Zyverdens objected to its admission into evidence, 
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however, the Court did not rule on that motion. 
Under the rules all that need be pleaded are ultimate 
facts, it being unnecessary to set forth in detail the acts, 
conduct, language or artifices used to accomplish the 
result (Rule 8(a), URCP; Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 U.2d 362, 
267 P.2d 759, 763). A complaint is required only to give 
the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type 
of litigation involved. (Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 U. 2d 
156, 280 P .2d 453, 455.) The pleadings, as filed (R. 40-43, 
258-273), and the pre-trial order (R. 182) all fully in-
formed Van Zyverdens as to the relief sought by Seagull 
and it was unnecessary to allege the service of any spe-
cific notices to state a cause of action for that relief since 
service of such notices are merely evidence to be pre-
sented at the trial. The fact that specific notices may have 
been mentioned in the pleadings does not limit the right 
of Seagull to introduce evidence of other notices which 
would establish evidence of facts necessary to support its 
claims for relief at the time of trial. Since it was un-
necessary to allege any specific notice in the complaint in 
the first instance, the failure to mention exhibit 5 is 
immaterial and should not prevent exhibit 5 from being 
introduced into evidence. The Court erred in not admit-
ting exhibit 5 into evidence. Seagull seeks restitution of 
the premises and damages. Exhibit 5 is merely evidence 
of facts which entitle Seagull to relief sought and Seagull 
is not asking for new or different relief. This notice was 
served 10 months before the trial and Van Zyverdens 
cannot claim surprise or prejudice for its being introduced 
into evidence. 
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Rule 15 (a) URCP provides in part as follows: 
" ... a party may amend his pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires . ... " (Emphasis added) 
If for any reason Seagull was required to specifically 
allege the notice contained in Exhibit 5 in its complaint 
before it could be admitted into evidence in this action 
(which we deny), in view of the clear mandate of the 
foregoing rule, the Court abused its discretion in re-
fusing to permit Seagull to amend when the motion for 
permission to amend was made at the time of trial (R. 
545). 
Rule 15 (b) contemplates the exact situation which oc-
curred in our case where evidence is objected to as not 
being within the issues of the pleadings, which rule reads 
in part as follows: 
" ... If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the ob-
jecting party to meet such evidence." (Emphasis 
added) 
The policy of the law is to avoid a multiplicity of 
actions and to resolve all issues that can be resolved in a 
single action. It was for this very reason that these two 
actions were consolidated for trial. The foregoing rule 
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indicates that the Court is to inquire into the merits and 
shall permit amendments during trial, if necessary, to get 
at the merits of the case and that if unfairness or surprise 
would result therefrom that the Court "shall" grant a 
continuance to avoid prejudice to the other party instead 
of excluding evidence which would assist in presenting 
the merits of the case. This is a clear mandate for the 
Court to look to the merits of the case rather than techni-
calities. In our situation the net effect of excluding Ex-
hibit 5 would be to require Seagull to bring a separate 
action based upon the service of Exhibit 5, if the Court 
determined for any reason that the other notices served 
were insufficient to establish a cause of action against 
Van Zyverdens and in favor of Seagull for Unlawful 
Detainer. In any event, Seagull's motion should have been 
granted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15(d), 
URCP, concerning supplemental pleadings which reads 
in part as follows: 
"Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reason-
able notice and upon such terms as are just, permit 
him to serve a supplernental pleading setting forth 
transactions or occurrences or events which have 
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be 
supplemented . ... " (Emphasis added) 
Van Zyverdens obviously agree that Seagull should be 
permitted to amend its pleadings to refer to exhibit 5 as 
shown by the following statement made by Van Zyver-
dens concerning this very same exhibit 5 at pages 4 and 5 
of their memorandum filed in case number 9917 in the 
Supreme Court of Utah in support of their complaint for 
extraordinary writ. In that case a writ of prohibition was 
obtained by Van Zyverdens to prevent Seagull from 
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proceeding with a separate legal action filed in the Dis-
trict Court based upon service of the notice contained in 
exhibit 5. 
"The point is that the Van Zyverdens are now being 
required to answer the Salt Lake County case and 
proceed to trial where that case involves the same 
precise claim for relief as is involved in the Wasatch 
County actions. Argument was made to Judge 
Hanson in the Salt Lake County case that Seagull 
Investment Company should be permitted to proceed 
there on the theory that it attached a notice which 
had not been served at the time of the filing of the 
case in Wasatch County. However, Seagull Invest-
ment Company asked leave to amend their complaint 
in Wasatch County during the course of trial on 
December 4, 1962 to attach the notice in question. 
While they have not sought leave to file a supple-
mental complaint in the Wasatch County action, they 
clearly have that right under the rule, and in that 
event, the same record and defenses would be avail-
able to the Van Zyverdens obviating the necessity of 
a new trial upon the same issues with a different 
record." (Emphasis added) 
The motion of Seagull to amend its pleadings to refer 
to exhibit 5 was not directed to any specific subdivision of 
Rule 15 and would apply with equal force to subdivision 
(d) regarding supplemental pleadings, if the court found 
that the notice was served after commencement of the 
other actions (we have demonstrated above that it was 
served 3 days before the counterclaim in Case No. 9946 
was filed) and to the other subdivisions of Rule 15 dis-
cussed above, and the proposition presented to the Court 
by Van Zyverdens in the above quoted statement in Case 
No. 9917 fully supports Seagull's position that the District 
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Court abused its discretion in not admitting exhibit 5 into 
evidence andjor permitting an amendment to Seagull's 
pleadings to refer to exhibit 5. Van Zyverdens should not 
be permitted to talk out of both sides of their mouth, and 
on the one hand to prevent Seagull from maintaining a 
separate action based upon exhibit 5 (Case No. 9917), and 
on the other hand to object to the admission of exhibit 5 
into evidence in these cases. 
That the policy of the law is to settle all matters 
between the parties in one action and to avoid a multi-
plicity of actions is further illustrated by Rule 54 (c) ( 1) 
pertaining to demands for judgment, which reads in part 
as follows: 
" ... every final judgment ... may, when the justice of 
the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of 
the parties on each side as between or among them-
selves." (Emphasis added) 
To leave the question of restitution of the premises un-
resolved and thereby require the filing of another lawsuit 
to determine that issue is to ignore the clear mandate of 
the foregoing rule. It is clear from the foregoing that Van 
Zyverdens are in default in the performance of their 
obligations concerning the purchase of the farm and that 
they are tenants at will of the farm. The "Ultimate 
Rights" of Seagull entitle them to possession of the farm. 
For the Court to close its eyes to these "ultimate rights" 
and to the service of Exhibit 5 (R. 233-240) is not only an 
abuse of discretion by the Court, but is contrary to the 
law and to the evidence, therefore the decision of the 
Court should accordingly be reversed. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED SEAGULL 
THE RELIEF TO WHICH IT WAS ENTITLED 
WHETHER DEMANDED OR NOT. 
The Court indicated in its decision that Seagull could 
have recovered possession of the farm if it had proceeded 
differently, but that Seagull had elected to proceed under 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute and had failed to comply 
with the provision thereof requiring service of a notice 
giving Van Zyverdens the option to perform the condi-
tions or surrender the premises. The decision of the Court 
reads in part as follows (R. 190) : 
" ... While the said plaintiff and counterclaimant 
might well have pursued a different course to recover 
possession, it having elected to proceed under the 
statute, it was necessary to comply with its pro-
visions .... " (Emphasis added) 
In essence the Court is indicating that Seagull proved 
its case for restitution of the premises under the terms of 
the contract (R. 226) but that, under the Court's view of 
the pleadings filed, relief was not requested under any 
theory other than the Unlawful Detainer Statute and 
accordingly the Court could not grant any other relief to 
Seagull, the Court having determined that the notice 
served (R. 266-273) was insufficient to comply with the 
requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute (R. 190). 
Seagull attempted to plead claims for relief in the 
alternative under both the breach of contract theory and 
the unlawful detainer theory as more fully discussed 
under point II ab.ove. The complaint (R. 261-262) and the 
counterclaim (R. 42) clearly demonstrate that Seagull 
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sought damages for breach of contract, restitution of the 
premises and attorney fees, in addition to triple damages 
for unlawful detainer. The complaint and counterclaim 
also ask for such other general relief as the Court deems 
proper in the circumstances. The policy of the law is to do 
substantial justice to a party even if the pleadings are 
inexpertly framed by his attorney. Rule 54(c) (1), URCP 
provides in part as follows: 
" ... every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings . ... " (Emphasis added) 
The Court erred in failing to apply this rule when it 
indicated in its decision that Seagull was entitled to 
possession of the farm, but that it had proceeded under 
the wrong theory to obtain possession. Seagull denies that 
it failed to ask for possession of the premises under the 
theory of breach of contract, but even if Seagull com-
pletely failed to request restitution under the proper 
theory, nevertheless, the Court, having determined that 
Seagull was entitled to possession, and the evidence of the 
breach by Van Zyverdens and their becoming tenants at 
will clearly appearing throughout the record, should have 
awarded restitution in accordance with the provisions of 
the above quoted rule. (Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U. 10, 
165 P. 513; Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 U. 2d 226, 310 
P. 2d 517.) 
In addition judgment should be awarded for the rea-
sonable rental value of the farm for the period during 
which Van Zyverdens have had possession thereof of 
$425.00 per month (see discussion R. 663) or for such 
other sum as the Court determines to be reasonable. 
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POINT V 
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST 
VAN ZYVERDENS FOR TAXES, WATER ASSESS-
MENTS AND DAMAGES REQUESTED BUT NOT 
RULED UPON BY THE COURT. 
In both cases Seagull prayed, under the terms of the 
contract (R. 226), for judgment for restitution of the 
premises, for attorney fees (which are discussed else-
where in this brief), and for damages for breach of con-
tract (R. 42-43, 261-262). In Case No. 9945 separate causes 
of action are stated for the $5,000.00 down payment which 
was not paid, for property taxes in the sum of $333.98, and 
irrigation water assessments of $397.82, which were paid 
by Seagull (R. 40-43), but these causes of action were not 
ruled upon by the Court. The evidence clearly shows that 
Van Zyverdens contracted and agreed to pay said amounts 
(R. 226) and that they were not paid (R. 543-544) and 
accordingly Seagull is entitled, as a matter of law, to 
judgment for said amounts and for restitution of the 
premises, attorney fees and other damages established by 
the evidence. 
POINT VI 
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST 
VAN ZYVERDENS FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
The Court failed to rule on Seagull's claim for attorney 
fees (R. 43, 262) for the prosecution of these actions. 
Seagull relies upon the provisions of paragraph 21 of 
Exhibit 1 (R. 226) to establish its right to recover attor-
ney fees, which provision reads as follows: 
"21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should 
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they default in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay 
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing 
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of 
Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise." (Emphasis added) 
The election of Seagull to terminate Van Zyverdens' 
interest in and to the farm and Exhibit 1 (R. 226) by 
reason of their failure to remedy their default, does not in 
any manner affect the rights of Seagull under that con-
tract, including the right to recover attorney fees. Para-
graph 16A thereof indicates that only the Seller (Seagull) 
shall be released from obligation to convey the property 
to the Buyers (Van Zyverdens). At no place in the con-
tract or notices have the rights of Seagull been terminated 
or affected. The Court should enforce the clear intention 
of the parties as expressed by the written contract. For-
rester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206; Burt v. Stringfellow, 
45 U. 207, 143 P. 234; Udy v. Jensen, 63 U. 94, 222 P. 597. 
The wording of paragraph 21 (R. 226) indicates that 
the parties contemplated this exact situation, where it 
was necessary to enforce the rights of the sellers in the 
event of default by the buyers, and the parties selected 
broad language which would apply to all litigation which 
might arise in connection with the contract including an 
action under the terms of the contract or an action under 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute. Attorney fees are accord-
ingly recoverable by Seagull whether the action is main-
tained under the contract or under the Unlawful Detainer 
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Statute. Additional evidence should be permitted to es-
tablish the value of the legal services, including those in 
connection with this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues before the Court are clear. Van Zyverdens 
acquired possession of the farm in question in September, 
1960, with no down payment and since that time have 
paid nothing toward the purchase price, have failed to 
pay the property taxes, irrigation water assessments, or 
to keep the property insured, although they have had the 
use and benefit of the property during this entire period. 
The Court found that their claim for an offset was without 
foundation and awarded judgment of no cause of action. 
During this period Seagull has been required to make 
payments on the Michelsen contract (R. 230-231) and to 
pay the property taxes and water assessments to avoid 
total loss of the property. It is apparent that this pro-
longed litigation is an effort to put Seagull into such a 
financial squeeze that they will be forced to sell the farm 
to Van Zyverdens on the Van Zyverdens' terms to avoid 
a total loss of the farm. 
Van Zyverdens, with advice of counsel, have intention-
ally pursued a course of action in complete disregard of 
the rights of Seagull. It would have been a simple matter 
for Van Zyverdens to have made the payments due to 
Seagull into the Court to preserve their rights under the 
contract. The unpaid balance due on the contract was in 
excess of $55,000.00, payable over a period of years, and 
accordingly Van Zyverdens could have safely made their 
payments to Seagull as well as pursue their legal action 
for an offset, if they were bona fide about their claims, 
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since the unpaid balance was sufficiently large to have 
protected them to the extent of the entire $18,000.00 
claimed by Van Zyverdens in their action. 
It is also apparent that Van Zyverdens have at all times 
been unable to meet their obligations under Exhibit 1, or 
to pay for the farm. 
The defenses raised by Van Zyverdens to the relief 
sought by Seagull amount to nothing more than technical 
objections to procedure, do not go to the merits and are 
stalling actions. The various notices served upon Van 
Zyverdens clearly appraised them of their option to rem-
edy their default or to quit the premises. Nothing more 
could be accomplished by the service of additional notices 
since Van Zyverdens failed to make any effort to remedy 
any of their defaults. Van Zyverdens are tenants at will 
of the premises. Clearly Seagull is entitled to restitution 
of the premises, attorney fees, and to damages. To affirm 
the judgment of the District Court could only result in an 
additional trial with the same parties, the same issues, and 
the same evidence with the ultimate result that Seagull 
would obtain the relief to which it is entitled. Clearly the 
judgment of the District Court is contrary to the evidence 
and to the law and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Seagull Investment Co. 
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